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Forum

Environmentalist thinking and/in geography
Organizing editor: Sarah A. Radcliffe*
Contributors: Elizabeth E. Watson, Ian Simmons,
Felipe Fernández-Armesto and Andrew Sluyter
Abstract: In recent years, a new type of determinist environmental thinking has emerged. It
can be understood to be one strand in a much broader realm of ‘environment talk’. Many human
geographers have expressed a combination of scepticism and surprise at the apparently inexorable
rise of the neo-environmentalist arguments which differ from early twentieth-century environmental
determinism yet continue to draw upon biologistic accounts of human culture. Although geography
has in recent years been at the forefront of the academic discussions of environmental change
in relation to science, institutional context, political costs and human impacts, the discipline
nevertheless has to contend with a widespread misperception of the place of environment in human
affairs and the world’s future. This Forum discusses the context for the rise of, and consequences
of, determinist accounts.
Key words: geographical explanations, global development, global inequality, human-animal
relations, neo-environmental determinism, political ecology.

Introduction: the status of the
‘environment’ in geographical
explanations
The immediate stimulus for this Forum is the
perception among a number of geographers
across the subfields of their discipline that
‘the environment’ has in certain spheres been
brought into arguments that attribute it with
powerful and singular causal power; and,
moreover, that these arguments have been
associated with the discipline in ways that
have various effects on the nature of geographical explanations and their public
prominence.
In recent years a certain type of determinist environmental thinking has emerged.

It can be understood to be one strand in a
broader discourse of what we can call academic ‘environment talk’ (which includes
political ecology, environmental history,
climatology, and many others). Yet this ‘neoenvironmental determinism’ (Sluyter, this
Forum) is characterized by an emphasis on
the core explanatory power of non-human/
non-animal components of the biophysical
sphere in shaping human outcomes (in relation to development, disease, conflict, responses to climate change, etc). Whereas
other forms of environmental talk, such as
political ecology (eg, Peet and Watts, 2004),
highlight the contingent historically and geographically specific cultural meanings and
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human engagements with environmental
processes, neo-environmental determinism
claims to discern invariable dynamics between (certain kinds of) society and ‘the’ environment. These determinist frameworks
differ from early twentieth-century versions
of environmental determinism in a number of
ways.1 First, in intellectual terms, recent determinisms have emerged in the context of
widespread knowledge of Darwinian evolution, atmospheric and climate science, ‘new
genetics’, and detailed ecological and social
knowledges, all of which create a more
knowledge-rich starting point (while also providing the basis of robust critiques of these
same environmental determinisms; see
below). Second, in terms of sociopolitical contexts, current environmental determinisms
reflect subtle arguments about ‘cultural’ determinism, rather than crass racial ideologies.
However, as Felipe Fernández-Armesto
makes clear (this Forum), the concept
‘culture’ can be used as if it were equivalent to
a biologically determined entity, and he
thereby reveals the biologisms that underlie
certain strands of neo-environmental determinist thinking.
Many human geographers have expressed
a combination of scepticism and surprise at
the apparently inexorable rise of such arguments. Johnston (2007) calls Jared Diamond
– whose books have often provided a lightning rod for critique and debate – ‘a late interloper … [but] not [a geographer] really’.
Yet there has been a surprising lack of discussion about the implications of the rise of
neo-environmental determinist arguments.
Geographical journals have tended to engage
with these arguments through book reviews,
as well as indirectly in articles presenting detailed analyses of environment-society relations (as indeed do numerous books). Yet
relatively little has been written systematically about these arguments in terms of
their validity (or lack of it) within the discipline, about their implications for human geographers’ and environmentalists’ attempts
to bring non-determinist research to a

public audience, and the potential long-term
consequences for the discipline of these highprofile representations of ‘geography’.
Hence the diverse contributors to this
Forum were invited to engage in a broader
way than they might in scholarly writing and
teaching with questions about the politics,
consequences and intellectual basis of these
arguments, and their connection with their
own fields of inquiry. From varying perspectives, the contributors address questions
such as the following. Should geography
engage with environmentally determinist
arguments in the public arena and other disciplines? If so, how and to what ends? How do
existing forms of environmental determinism
affect the content and form of knowledges
produced by human and physical geographers
broadly defined? Environmental determinist
thinking, of course, comprises a number of
differing arguments, fields of inquiry, and
publicly accessible discourses – while some
contributors mention specific names, others
address themselves to what they perceive
to be wider, more diffuse influences of neoenvironmental determinism on public debate.
As noted above, Jared Diamond occupies
a specific position in these debates, not only
because of the fame and high sales of his
books, but also because of his appointment
to and profile in, professional academic geography. Jared Diamond has been appointed
to the UCLA Geography Department,
and gave one of the plenaries at the 2007
American Association of Geographers’ annual meeting, in which he rehearsed the arguments developed in his best-selling books
Guns, germs and steel and Collapse. Although
Diamond always attributes environmental
factors with a partial role in societal change,
his discussion tends to highlight these factors
at the cost of others. Yet it is invidious to
single out one individual, as similar arguments
(albeit not based on Diamond’s zoological
research) have also been gaining a wider currency within public understandings of what
‘geography’ is (eg, Posner, 2004; cf. Geertz,
2005). Arguments about conflict in Sudan
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and elsewhere in Africa are increasingly emphasizing the role of climate change, downplaying the political interpretations that have
long held sway in the scholarly understandings of famine, conflict and land shortages
(UNEP, 2007; de Waal, 2007).
One area in which environmentally determinist arguments have gained public –
although not always professional – salience
is in relation to global issues and inequality.
Ian Simmons (Simmons, this Forum) points
out that geographers need global narratives
because of the scale and predicted transformative power of global climate change.
Separately, however, Andrew Sluyter and
Elizabeth Watson each point out how not
all global narratives are the same. As neoenvironmental determinist accounts of
global climate change offer universalizing
explanations, other types of explanation –
those that point to legacies of colonialism,
racially segregated labour markets, or locally
motivated political conflict – fade from view
(Sluyter, this Forum; Watson, this Forum).
Neo-environmental determinist narratives
risk obscuring the interactions between local,
regional, and specific global processes by highlighting supposedly worldwide processes,
thereby doing an injustice to the extensive
work in geography on scalar interactions. Yet,
in a universalizing picture, the ‘environment’ –
in the sense of desertification, drought, disease, and so on – gains a spurious ranking in an
explanatory framework, while other factors
such as society, culture, politics, geopolitical relations, and history are pushed into the
background (compare Adams and Mulligan,
2003). Tanya Murray Li suggests that ‘engaging simplifications’ may have powerful
social and political consequences, as they
appear to offer a route-map for politicians
and planners alike (Li, 2002).
To the extent that the discipline of geography articulates an account of global
climate change and its various local and regional ramifications (from melting polar ice to
agrarian transformations in the Sahel), it too
is entangled in the power of such engaging
simplifications. In other words, geography’s
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profile – as a field of research endeavour, as a
claimant on public funds, and as a ‘relevant’
subject in instrumentally orientated times –
rests in part on its credentials as a contributor
to the global climate change debate. The challenge for geography lies in creating a discipline that reflects the complexity of – rather
than simplifies – accounts of the world, without losing sight of a synthetic account.
As noted above, neo-environmental determinisms often draw on a biologistic model of
human culture. They see the concept as a
tool by which to differentiate one social group
from another in explanations of relative
flexibility in face of stress, or adaptability
to new opportunities. While such accounts
have certainly replaced nineteenth- and
early twentieth-century racial explanations
(cf. Sluyter, this Forum), the denial of the
powerful hierarchies of (racial/cultural) value
and the strongly influential histories and geographies of colonialism and imperialism speak
more to progress in laboratory science than to
the careful, extensively documented and appropriately researched findings of hundreds
of social scientists (among them geographers)
over the past 30 years (Kobayashi and Peake,
2000). By drawing on biological science
rather than social science, such accounts
fall prey to the engaging simplifications of
Malthusian arguments (Simmons, this
Forum). Yet even laboratory science and
its findings are only selectively drawn upon.
For instance, extensive work on the lack
of easy boundaries between human and
animal societies and cultures (documented
in Fernández-Armesto, this Forum) highlights the need to rethink our category of
‘culture’. More importantly in the context of
this Forum, we need to acknowledge that
history is the explanatory timeline relevant
for human-environment relations, rather
than evolutionary time.
The Forum is in three parts. The first
comprises a discussion of the various ways in
which neo-environmental determinism is
affecting geographers’ sense of their explanatory frameworks in the classroom, and
in public debates. Through books such as
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Jared Diamond’s Collapse (2005) or Bjørn
Lomborg’s The skeptical environmentalist
(2001), professional geographers are reminded of the myriad ways in which ‘big’
global environmental issues bring students
into our departments, drive high-level policy
debates, and remind us how our own personal research interests only too frequently
remain constrained in scope and scale contributing incrementally to a wider project of
expanding and transmitting knowledge
(Castree et al., 2008). In Part II, there is a direct refutation of two forms of determinism
shaping current debate: first, the idea that
evolution determines the circumstances of
human groups today and, second, the notion
that human ‘cultures’ correspond analogously to organisms, and are thus subject to
evolutionary pressures. As Felipe FernándezArmesto argues, neither of these doctrines is
helpful in offering insight or explanatory frameworks for social change, nor environmentsociety relations. In other words, although
social scientists have Darwinian evolutionary
theory in their toolkit as a broad intellectual
setting, they find its insights too broad-brush
as a proximate framework to understand,
to pick a random example, how indigenous
forest dwellers in Bolivia negotiate with state
conservation initiatives. In Part III, the context in which neo-environmental determinism emerged is examined. The neoliberal
political economy of the North in combination with the South’s continued underdevelopment are suggested as factors behind
the public salience of neo-environmentalist
accounts.
This Forum provides no straightforward
response to the rise of neo-environmental
determinism. While certain contributors are
keen to engage students in the debate, others
are more concerned to raise issues with university administrators and professional
bodies. But the Forum does, we hope, contribute to what is likely to be an ongoing, and
at times heated, discussion. It offers us some
pointers about the stakes involved in the rise
of neo-environmental determinism, some of

the intellectual and institutional consequences. It also suggests that we need constantly
to interrogate and evaluate critically the ways
in which forms of knowledge gain power.
Without advocating that geography engage
in other ‘simplifications’, the contributors to
this Forum imply that there is still a job to be
done to make other complex stories accessible and powerful in public debates.
In conclusion, although geography has
in recent years been at the forefront of the
academic discussions of environmental
change in relation to science, institutional context, political costs and human impacts, the
discipline nevertheless has to contend with
a widespread misperception of the place of
environment in human affairs and the world’s
future. Given its research strengths and professional standing, geography – and geographers – can directly engage with and
challenge such views, contributing to urgent
conversations in academia and policy arenas
alike. This public role must, however, be
counterbalanced by an awareness of its own
institutional and professional investments in
the field of environmental studies. The power
of ‘environmental big-talk’ to raise geography’s profile, particularly perhaps in countries where it has not had a large presence
in universities, must be weighed against the
risk of simplifying the causal drivers behind
global environmental and climate changes.
Sarah A. Radcliffe
University of Cambridge
Part I: Types of determinist
environmental thinking
1 Convenient examples for inconvenient truths
In a Masters on Environment, Society and
Development that I co-teach with Tim BaylissSmith at the Department of Geography, the
students are asked to read and debate Jared
Diamond’s Collapse (2005). Student criticisms
of his thesis often start with a questioning
of the way Diamond selects his examples.
They suggest that perhaps he chooses his
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cases to support his storyline. Students also
comment that, although he gives credit to
non-environmental factors in his five-point
framework for explaining historical change
and disintegration of societies, all too often
the cases are structured in a way that relegates non-environmental factors to a lower
tier of significance. The Rwandan study is
a case in point. Diamond makes clear that
environmental factors were only one contributory factor in the genocide, and that there
is no automatic link between population
pressure, competition for scarce natural resources, and conflict. But he ends by citing
the work on Rwanda by Gérard Prunier,
who comments that competition for land
and livestock was not a ‘negligible incentive’.
Diamond concludes with the warning that
‘Malthus’s worst-case scenario may sometimes be realized, and that Rwanda may
be a distressing model of that scenario in
operation’ (Diamond, 2005: 327–28). One
student commented: ‘I read the chapter on
Rwanda, and I appreciated everything he
said about other factors, but afterwards,
all I could remember was that the genocide
had been caused by population growth and
environmental pressure.’
The emphasis on the environmental factor
is also produced by the overall structure of
Diamond’s book. Each chapter tells a complex story in terms of the interrelations between social, political, economic and environmental factors, but the element that links
them all is that the changes in the environment have been partly responsible at least
for the history of each case. By placing all
of these examples side by side, the reader is
encouraged to identify this common thread,
and to conclude that the environment is the
most significant consideration. Other factors
that vary from case to case become less important. This conclusion is also supported by
Diamond’s more explicit commentary on the
role of the environment, and the way in which
analysts have ignored it in recent years.
Diamond’s argument thus reasserts the
logic of Malthus and others that population
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growth, left unchecked, leads to a ‘natural’
chain of events: population growth leads to
agricultural intensification, expansion onto
marginal land, unsustainable practices and
environmental damage; to food shortages,
starvation, ‘wars among too many people
fighting for too few resources’ and political
upheaval; to population decrease and ‘loss of
political, economic and cultural complexity’
(Diamond, 2005: 6). The logic of this argument has been critiqued extensively by geographers, anthropologists and others, who
have, for some time now, challenged its oversimplifications. The environmental degradation narrative continues to endure, despite
much evidence to the contrary, because it
serves powerful interests (for a review of
this critique, see Leach and Mearns, 1996).
What is striking is that, despite this largely
accepted critique, Diamond’s reworking of
Malthus has been warmly received, with
the book topping the non-fiction best-selling
lists. Diamond has been embraced by the
geographical academy. The welcoming of
Diamond’s argument represents therefore a
radical shift, even reversal, in perspective.
The question is why? One explanation is
in the new context in which we are working:
the current global environmental crisis is now
so severe and pressing that Malthusian
thinking, and the deterministic role of the
environment, is relevant again.
In effect, the extent of the global environmental crisis has brought with it a new requirement for meta-explanations that will be
able to bring about action strong enough to
mitigate its effects. One danger here is that
the sweeping explanation gives insufficient
attention to what is happening at local scales.
New epistemological violence can be done to
different places and peoples as they come to
symbolize and exemplify certain parts of the
wider environmental storyline. The subtitle
of Diamond’s book is how ‘societies choose
to fail or survive’, and the examples cited are,
at times, categorized into exemplary models
to emulate, or into cautionary tales. The
question is, are you a Tikopia or an Iceland
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(success stories), or a Rwanda or a Somalia
(‘ecocides’)? As with the Orientalist discourse
(Said, 1978), this environmental narrative
works through a process of crude othering.
For example, Somalia symbolizes, even epitomizes, collapse, ecocide, an inability to
do anything about one’s problems, apathy,
and potentially our own destiny should we
‘fall’; by contrast, the association between
the ‘first world’ and a particular form of
‘civilization’ that must be defended is also
enshrined. The details of what is happening in
Somalia are not discussed, but the country is
cited in the beginning and the end of the book
as a warning: ‘Either we solve the [environmentally related] problems by then, or the
problems will undermine not just Somalia but
also First World societies’ (Diamond, 2005:
7). The success stories are also questionable.
For example, little is known about the environment and settlement history of Tikopia
prior to the twentieth century. One thing
that is known, however, is that young Tikopia
men set off on lone suicide voyages in fragile
canoes when this ‘success story’ became
too much for them to bear (Bayliss-Smith,
personal communication). A second danger
is that, if the knowledge about a place is not
correct, then any policies on which they are
based are likely to be inappropriate. One
of the main reasons for failures of development and conservation is that policies have
often been based on one-size-fits-all models,
developed on a larger scale.
Despite their recognition of some of these
concerns, it is also striking that student
feedback remains nonetheless positive. In
support of Diamond’s argument, they comment that it ‘brings the environment back in’,
‘raises awareness’, ‘sets the agenda’ and demonstrates ‘how pressing the problem of
environmental change is’. One student commented: ‘it identifies the choice we have.
Societies that collapsed didn’t have the knowledge and perspective that this book provides, and it can therefore be used to bring
about change.’ Many of our masters students
are already committed to this agenda. Some

students may also be frustrated by being given
different readings (not Diamond) that stress
that problems of development, including
poverty, disease, food shortages and conflict,
are not necessarily ‘natural’, technological
problems or even results of a lack of economic
growth, but are complex political problems
about distribution, rights and access to resources. Whatever the case, the only certainty that emerges from contemporary
literature is that achieving sustainable development is not easy. The current context of
global climate change provides the impetus
to cut through these complexities and this
hand-wringing with grand theories which
provide an agenda for global-scale action.
Theories are contextual; and in this context
Diamond’s schema is seductive. What seems
to be happening in Diamond’s work, and elsewhere in public debate, is a new tacking backwards and forwards between the globallevel environmental problem and the local
situation, between the macro and the micro
situation, and there is a new politics to it. The
new global environmental agenda can ‘trump’
local processes and agendas, especially more
complex political ones.
These dynamics are also evident in policy
debates in development circles. One example
of this is the media coverage of a UNEP
report (2007) claiming that Darfur was the
‘first climate change war’ (Julian Borger,
The Guardian, 28 June 2007). Ban Ki-moon,
the UN Secretary-General, explained in a
speech:
Almost invariably, we discuss Darfur in a convenient military and political shorthand – an
ethnic conflict pitting Arab militias against
black rebels and farmers. Look to its roots,
though, and you discover a more complex
dynamic. Amid the diverse social and political
causes, the Darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part from climate
change. (Ban Ki-Moon, Washington Post 16
June 2007, added emphasis)

What happens here is that a simplistic narrative that explains conflict in terms of ‘ancient
tribal enmities’ between primordial groups
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in Africa has been replaced with another
narrative pointing to the climate change
‘culprit’ in which many years of political and
historically informed analytical work is overlooked. De Waal’s (2007) treatment of the
argument concludes that environmental
change may be a factor in the problems
experienced in Darfur, but ultimately the
explanations for what has happened must
pay more attention to political processes,
distribution of rights and the role of government. An environmental cause has yet to
be proved. What is important is not to identify one factor as more determinant over
the others, but to examine the way in which
different factors link up and impact on
each other. It is this network of causality
and process that requires investigation and
understanding.
In economics too, there is a new literature
that tries to correlate political stability (or
political effectiveness; levels of democracy)
with environmental factors. In this ‘resource
curse’ literature, global-scale analysis is carried out by comparing data from different
countries to explain historical outcomes in
terms of whether or not being rich or poor
in natural resource terms is likely to lead
to development or to chaos and conflict.
Sophisticated equations demonstrate links
between forms of political system and dependence on, or abundance of, natural resources (see Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008;
Brunnschweiler, 2008). It is not easy for a
non-specialist to comment on this technical
work, but, even to the untrained eye, their
work raises strong concerns about the data
on which global and national comparisons
are made. The literature acknowledges that
the data are often unreliable and patchy,
especially in the global South. Further assumptions are included as systems’ stability
or success are categorized according to broad
criteria: for example, parliamentary systems
are assumed to work more in the public good
than presidential regimes (Brunnschweiler
and Bulte, 2008). In addition, a project that
draws correlations between only two factors,
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in this case environmental resources and
political outcomes, is limited. Situations like
Darfur show that there are multiple factors
that influence outcomes and conflicts; many
of the factors are political and historical,
and they are caused by relations between
countries as much as they are by relations
within countries. None of these processes are
accounted for in the models. This economic
literature is highly influential, however, as
when politics and processes are translated
into numbers the models gain authority. Yet
the generalized global and national pictures
they portray may not have included information from certain localities, and may not
fit with what is taking place there. Most
notably, for example, this literature may be
used to make policy in parts of Africa where
the ‘resource curse’ theory is often thought
most relevant. But some African countries
are not always represented in the global-scale
analysis as the data are highly inaccurate
and/or often lacking.
One question posed by the call for contributions to this Forum was, should geographers engage with environmentally deterministic arguments in the public arena and
other disciplines? In response to this, the
Diamond material, the Darfur case and the
short discussion of the economic material
reveal that this environmental determinism
can take different forms and has different
agendas and impacts. They are forms of
what Li (2002) has termed ‘engaging simplifications’, that capture the imagination of
the public and aim to overcome apathy and
change behaviour. Many applaud such arguments because they agree with the ends
that they promote. But, like other engaging
simplifications, they can distort realities as
well as result in unintended consequences,
frequently with negative impacts on the
least powerful. Simplified models can give
decision-makers a false sense of confidence
that the problems are easy to identify and the
solutions straightforward to implement. In
response to this situation, geographers are in
a good place to trace the more complex ways
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in which environmental and other factors
interrelate. Perhaps the challenge is to remain
engaged with policy and to communicate research and analysis, while maintaining that
engagement with complexity. The role of the
academy should be to support these efforts.
Political ecology is one area of geography
that focuses on unpacking the ways in which
changing societies and populations intersect with changing environments. Political
ecology aims to examine social, political and
environmental processes, and to take into
account the way in which different scales
(the local, regional, national and global) interrelate. But here, too, political ecologists have
been criticized for being very good at their
political and Foucauldian analysis, and much
less good at understanding environmental
change and the role it plays (for a review, see
Walker, 2005). The ascendancy of environmental-driven analysis in Diamond’s and
others’ work has some justification. It is important to engage with environmental processes, and to explore, in more depth, the
way in which the different factors interrelate. Geographers, who work with physical
material processes and sociopolitical ones,
ought to be leading the field in this area –
tracing the way in which different scales
interrelate and making space to understand
and appreciate local difference and local
perspectives and interests (wherever that
‘local’ might be, near or far). Such issues of
representation and understanding are not
straightforward, especially in cross-cultural
contexts, and – worryingly – debates about
these matters appear to have become less
rather than more prominent in geographical
literature in recent years.
Global climate change may be an ‘inconvenient truth’, but it is likely to be a significant one with untold outcomes for everyone. The full nature of its impacts requires
full investigation, and policies designed to
mitigate it deserve to be based on as full an
understanding as possible of the circumstances on the ground, however complex
such circumstances may prove. Such an

understanding comes from examining and
discussing different case-study examples,
convenient or not. Only in this way will it
be possible to trace out the varying impact
of climate change with rigour, and to understand the places and communities in which
different policies to address it must be based.
Elizabeth E. Watson
University of Cambridge
2 Environmental determinism in geographers’
environments
Since the 19th century, the Promethean
mythology (for which read ‘modernism’) has
been dominant: the stealing of fire (for which
read ‘energy resources’) has apparently allowed the development for humans of a
world without limits. Where geographers
take our clues from the natural sciences, we
adopt those parts of a Promethean narrative
that suggest that science-based knowledge
(which many equate to control) is the key to
all progress. In the social sciences many of us
are heirs to myths about the perfectibility of
humankind and we (nearly) all accept a myth
of a cosmic hierarchy with Homo sapiens well
above other primates, trees and rocks as a
working reality: no ‘deep ecology’ for us (cf.
Fernández-Armesto, this Forum).
I was tempted to begin — and end —
this piece with the four letters ‘IPCC’. For
every report of that influential body is watermarked with the message that the limits of
atmospheric resilience are about to be reached
and that human societies have to adapt their
behaviour to prevent any further stretching of
the apparently fragile envelope that confines
weather and climate to fluctuations with
which we can cope. Such terseness would of
course be frowned upon but it reminded me
of the role of spatial scale. The argument is no
longer about worker productivity in New
England or the evolution of the epicanthic
fold but about the whole planet. At some
levels, even the most determined postmodernists have not challenged some of the
features of the biophysical world as set out
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in the laws of physics: the presence and
strength of gravity, for example, or the laws
regarding the conservation of energy. Maybe
the part of the second law of thermodynamics that seems to govern time has
been keenly scrutinized but not even Big Oil
has yet announced any work on sucking back
the heat from burning fossil fuels once it has
reached space. Working ‘inwards’ from that
perspective, there has arisen a view of the
globe’s biophysical systems as constituting
a kind of envelope. Our discussions have
largely been about whether this is made of
a flexible material which can be pushed outwards indefinitely or whether it impinges
differentially from place to place according
to political or technological regimes.
Other constructions of the world often
then adopt a particular spatial scale in putting forward their view of the envelope and
its contents. In doing so, they also bring along
factors such as the directness of the environmental processes involved: there is a clear
difference between the onset of an oceanwide tsunami and the decision to grow organic
carrots; the rate of change is a different
entity in the regimes of mountain glaciers
versus the adoption of Green Revolution
crops in the 1960s, so that there are a series
of buffers between a physical force or a biological system which allow societies to
mediate at the flexible ends of the directness
spectrum. The human agency most involved
(it is no surprise to find) has been access to
energy resources that can be applied to the
biophysical systems in the form of technology. Thus in energy-rich societies the buffers are strongest: as Max Frisch said, in his
novel Homo faber (1957), ‘Technology is
a way of organizing the world so that man
doesn’t have to experience it’.
So, surrounding us all the time but impinging only from time to time and place to
place there are determinist ideas and policies
which come through a variety of channels as
well as, occasionally, the brutal directness
of a tsunami, an earthquake or a typhoon.
In the social sciences the most common
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avenue of barely mediated concern is labelled Malthusian. There are a number of ways
in which population growth is regarded with
anxiety. The most social in its orientation is
the way in which a given society can cope
with populations that double every 20 years
or so and in which there are so many young
people without many future opportunities; at
the inflexible end of the thinking is the underlying notion (derived mostly from ecological
science) of carrying capacity. There may be,
it is argued, a finite limit to the number of
humans that can be fed or watered or kept
from each others’ throats, and that limit is a
consequence of the biophysical character of
the planet mediated through a number of
feedback mechanisms. Even as I write (June
2008), the FAO has been having ‘crisis’
meetings, a fact related to the oil prices hitting US$130 that same month. After the
UN Population Conference in Cairo in 1994
it was rather un-PC to mention Malthus,
but I think his ghost is now showing itself
again well beyond the streets of Bath, in
whose Abbey his memorial is affixed. This
on-and-off attention span is indicative of the
way in which many topics that feed into a
complex discussion seem like temporary
crystallizations in flows of energy, matter
and ideas, rather than the hard-edged lumps
of thinking that dominate any account that
is in writing.2
Yet, to be repetitive, the climate professionals are the most direct inheritors of the
radical environmentalist school of thought
which has swirled around and through the
western world since the 1960s. Even though
the mode of transmission is that of the ‘greenhouse gases’, the message is clear: adapt to
the carbon flows of the planet or else suffer
unpredictable fluctuations of amplitude of
climate and weather. The more optimistic
responses, such as those of Bjorn Lomborg,
argue that the situation is negotiable and
that money be spent on adapting to rapid
change rather than trying to prevent it: in
other words to deny the existence of limits
to human societies (Lomborg, 2001). To read

10

Progress in Human Geography

the material of the more environmentalist
end of the spectrum, and to see the almost
desperate attempts of many media to foster
ways by which to lower our individual carbon footprints is perhaps to acknowledge
that radical environmentalism has been a
carrier of western Puritanism and that its
proponents have a little more in common
with the Taleban than they would care to
admit. But how long will this last? Media
attention spans are notoriously short and
‘democratic’ governments are always wary
of which voters they might offend. Evoking
Puritanism, at any rate in the western world,
brings us back into the sphere of myth.
The Promethean myth is not dead: ideas
of hi-tech carbon sequestration beneath the
oceans, deserts covered with solar panels and
sun-reflecting mirrors in space are the heirs
of the hollow stalk, as is the nuclear fusion
power which is always, it seems, 40 years
into the future. Most Greek legends have episodes of hubris followed by those of nemesis
and environmentalists sometimes point to the
uncomfortable time that Prometheus spent
chained to a rock and having his liver pecked
out by a vulture. So this myth has something
for everybody, including perhaps the story
that Zeus eventually freed Prometheus. It
seems the case that the concatenation of
Geography with other constructions of the
world is beset with myths, even though we
all choose to dress them up in other verbal
clothing. In such a context the appearance of
environmental determinism is perhaps like a
snake in a burrow – you don’t see much of it
but from time to time it whips out and bites
you; or maybe it is like that vulture, soaring
way above and thus ignored until nemesis
produces some corpses.
Ian Simmons
University of Durham
Part II: Questioning the notion of
human culture versus the environment
The chimpanzees’ tea party was a spectacle
I often enjoyed on childhood outings to the

zoo. Now my generation recalls it with
embarrassment, and even self-loathing,
as politically incorrect and injurious to
chimpanzees’ dignity. The chimps sat at a
table laden with teatime paraphernalia and
foodstuffs, and entertained the crowd by
making a mess. According to one of the
world’s leading experts on chimpanzee behaviour, they probably deliberately hammed
up the performance (de Waal, 2002: 52).
We onlookers, however, thought it funny –
though we may not have expressed it thus –
because we thought that humans were
uniquely cultural animals, and that chimps’
efforts to imitate our table manners were
vitiated by a fundamental inability to understand what manners were. Now the joke is
on us, because half a century of research has
taught us that we are not alone in possessing
culture, and that chimpanzees are among a
number of non-human cultural creatures:
practitioners, that is, of behaviours that are
socially but not practically functional and are
neither instinctive nor advantageous in an
evolutionary sense. Rather, they are transmitted by tradition and acquired by learning
(de Waal, 2001; de Waal and Tyack, 2003;
Hurley and Nudds, 2006; on dolphins, see also
Pryor and Norris, 1991; Mann et al., 2000).
So humans are not uniquely cultural. There
is, however, a conspicuous respect in which
humans still seem peculiar. Other animals’
cultures remain more or less static, whereas
those of humans are highly mutable – even
volatile. A huge question arises, perhaps the
biggest question the social sciences (broadly
defined, including history and human geography) are called on to answer or at least
address: why do human cultures, alone of
those of cultural animals, change so much?
The question seems – some might say,
threatens – to replace history with natural
history and human agency with the vast impersonal forces of environment and evolution.
It is reasonable – one might almost say
natural – to look to environment or evolution
for explanations. But, as I tried to show in
one of my books, widely divergent societies
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have often taken shape in similar or identical
environments (Fernández-Armesto, 2001).
Environment changes at rhythms very different from, and generally much slower than,
those observable in culture. Although there
are occasional cases, such as large-scale volcanic eruptions or the sudden evolution of a
new and powerful micro-organism, when the
rhythms of environmental and cultural change
coincide, these are too infrequent to account
for all the lurches of culture. So, although we
can accept, as a matter of common sense,
that environment influences culture, we can
set it aside as a source of direct explanation
for the innumerable variations in human cultures that arise over time.
Evolution, too, is bound to be part of any
picture of cultural behaviour, because,
although we humans may transcend it, we
have always to start from the point to which
it has brought us. All cultural animals are products of evolution and whatever disposes
them to cultural behaviour must be part of
the equipment with which evolution has furnished them. The search for a link between
evolution and culture has a long history (for
a good account, see Durham, 1991). Here I
want to address only two currently fashionable doctrines – forms of determinism, rooted
in scientific traditions concerning evolution,
which have helped to shape current or recent
debate: first, the argument that cultures are
collections of evolved individuals, whose inherited characteristics determine what happens to human communities; second, the
claim that cultures, or ‘units’ of which culture
is said to be composed, behave in ways so
closely analogous to organisms as to conform to evolutionary rules – evolving, for
instance, by selection of environmentally successful variations or by way of competition
between ‘units’ of culture, self-replicated like
genes. I want to suggest that neither of these
doctrines is helpful.
The evidence that some non-human
animals have culture began to pile up in the
early 1950s, when investigators in Japan observed a now famous macaque monkey
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instructing her tribe in her newly discovered
technique of washing the dirt off sweet potatoes before eating. Subsequent generations
learned how to do it and continue the tradition – with some modifications – to this day.
Proof that the practice is a rite rather than a
crudely useful function is that the monkeys
will always do the washing, even if humans
deliver the vegetables ready-cleaned, as if
in a supermarket (de Waal, 2002: 51). Since
the discovery of macaque culture, innumerable cultural practices have been detected in
many species of apes and monkeys and also,
according to investigators in the field, in
elephants, dolphins and rats. In some cases,
there is evidence of cultural divergence
among communities of a single species. In
some baboon tribes, for instance, males practise monogamy; in others, they have harems.
Different chimpanzee communities have
different technologies; some hunt quite intensively (Stanford, 1998), whereas others
do not. In different places, orang-utans play
different games. Yet it remains true to say
that cultural divergence – which is an index of
the scale and rate of cultural change – is very
small in non-human species, compared with
the immense diversity of human cultures.
To express the problem another way, it
would be otiose to attempt to write histories
of the societies of any cultural creatures
except humans. Even chimpanzees, who are
in just about every respect the creatures most
closely comparable to humans, hardly have
any history. They have politics, which the
great analyst of chimp political science, Frans
de Waal, has characterized as Machiavellian
(de Waal, 1986: 19). But, although one alpha
male from time to time successfully displaces
another, the nature of authority in chimpanzee
communities never changes. It would be
rash to say that it never could change. One
of the most curious episodes observed by
researchers in Tanzania was of a chimp low
down the ranking among the males of his
tribe who for a time successfully challenged
the leaders’ dominance by rolling packing
cases, appropriated from the primatologists’
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camp, across his rivals’ favoured tracks
through the forest. At first, the incumbents
were inclined to defer to him in their puzzlement; but his coup did not last long and no
permanent revolution occurred in the distribution of power or in the way in which
chimpanzee leaders emerge. Nonetheless, it
is tempting to see in this incident evidence
both of how limited the range of chimpanzee
political culture is compared to that of humans
and of how the distance might be narrowed in
the future (Goodall, 1990; Wrangham et al.,
1994). We no longer have alpha males running our societies as, presumably, our hominid
ancestors once did. We have replaced challenge and combat, which still prevails
among chimpanzees, with other means of
selecting leaders, by charisma, sacrality,
heredity, sagacity, demagogy. But among
chimpanzees it is already possible for an
individual to attain temporary ascendancy by
an innovative strategy. Over time, new kinds
of political change could become systematic
in chimpanzee societies, as in our own.
Meanwhile, humans are the only species
with history. But this form of human distinctiveness has accrued over time. It is not
‘natural’ to humans in the sense of having been
a feature of human life since Homo sapiens
first emerged. On the contrary, as far as we
can tell, for most of our existence, our species has been culturally stable – in key respects
as unchanging as other species. The earliest
divergences we can attribute to human cultures arose as a result of the migration of
Homo sapiens out of our native environment
in east Africa, about 100,000 years ago. Those
divergences were consequences of the need
to adapt to new and previously unexperienced environments, which produced, for
instance, variants in dress and foraging techniques, and of the sheer distances that arose
between increasingly sundered communities. I suspect that separation by distance
must have stimulated linguistic divergence,
which – to judge from the huge differences in
language today between contiguous peoples
in Australia and New Guinea, who in other

respects resemble each other closely in culture
– must have been an early form of societies’
mutual differentiation. Even so, the differences between widely dispersed peoples
in the palaeolithic era were small, by recent
standards, and not much greater than that
of many other primates. If art is the mirror of
society, the rate of change in palaeolithic
cultures was minimal. The recent discovery of
cave paintings at Chauvet, some 10,000 years
older than previously known examples of the
genre, reveals startling continuity in subjects,
techniques and treatment (Clottes, 2001).
So the peculiar mutability of human society
has its origins not in ‘human nature’ – whatever
that is – but in the circumstances of the relatively recent past. The increasing pace of
change, moreover, is not an inherent property of change, but a historical phenomenon.
It has occurred – for the most part – within a
relatively well-known and relatively welldocumented period, which can be said to
have coincided roughly with the Holocene,
and to have quickened spectacularly in the
last few centuries.
The critical gap between human and nonhuman cultural species therefore demands
a peculiarly human explanation. Evolution
seems generally too slow-working a mechanism to meet the case. Even the syncopations
of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ are too slow
and too rare. We can measure the pace of
human evolutionary divergence in our DNA
(Jorde et al., 1998); the results do not stand
comparison with the cultural divergence
historians record (Berry, 2002: 265–73).
Culture, moreover, seems un-Darwinian
because it is a story of the survival of the unfittest. Evolution has delivered, as far as we
can tell, no increase in the duration of species. So we should not demand that it deliver
more durable cultures. Nonetheless, we have
to take account of the fact that the most
adaptive cultures are not the fittest for survival, but the most prone to catastrophe.
A system which – independently of human
choice – imposed cultures equipped to survive
would select for foraging. Cultures which
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have stuck to that strategy have survived
for scores of millennia, whereas those that
have substituted sedentarism, urbanization,
agriculture and all the other adaptations we
associate with ‘civilization’ are one with
Nineveh and Tyre. The societies we class as
least evolved – least complex, least developed,
with fewest parts – are those that endure
longest, while elaborate civilizations collapse.
Our adaptations bear the fingerprints of free
will precisely because, so far, just about all of
them have been unsuccessful (FernándezArmesto, 2001). Their increasing pace looks
like a measure of increasing desperation.
The only serious attempt to solve this
problem – the theory of memes (Dawkins,
1976: 202–15) – is of little appeal, not least
because there is no evidence for the existence of memes, in the sense of evolved ‘units’
of culture, or of any mechanism analogous to
heredity, by which evolution could select
them for transmission to other cultures.
According to Richard Dawkins, who first
described memes and invented the name, a
meme is a ‘replicating entity’ and ‘a cultural
trait [that] may have evolved in the way
that it has, simply because it is advantageous
to itself’ (Dawkins, 1976: 206, 214, original
emphasis) – not to the people or society
who adopt it. It would be inconsistent with
Dawkins’s concept even to speak of memes
being ‘adopted’ in any sense that implies
conscious adoption – rather they colonize
their host societies, somewhat as parasites
infest bodies. This is a doubly unsatisfactory
doctrine. First, it requires another set of explanations to account for why different traits
achieve different levels of social influence: it
is easy to accept, for instance, that genes for
brown eyes should prevail over those for blue
eyes in a body where both are inherited; but
the same mechanisms cannot explain why,
say, Islam should prevail over Christianity in
a society with access to both (Smail, 2008:
96–97). Second, elements of culture have,
in the imaginary world of the meme, no
way of emerging except by a form of selfreplication reminiscent of spontaneous
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generation: innovations occur by way of
random mutation, rather than as a result
of human inventiveness. Even Dawkins
finds this an unsustainable way of thinking
about culture, crediting Socrates, Leonardo,
Copernicus and Marconi with ‘contributions’
of ‘meme-complexes’ commendable for
their longevity. This gets close to saying that
human minds originate cultural traits – which
is what everyone’s experience suggests. If
that is so, it is unnecessary to endow memes
with a life of their own. Humans think them
up in the first place; so humans can adopt
them and reject them as they wish.
Indeed, what Dawkins calls cultural traits
can all fairly be represented as ideas, because
everything else he includes – technologies,
techniques, tunes, teachings – do not appear
on earth fully formed or leap from culture to
culture except, in the first instance, as purely
mental facts, communicated between minds.
Even in the case of an artifact which arrives
by trade or chance in a milieu where it is unfamiliar, and spreads by being copied, it is
not effectively transmitted from its culture
of origin to its host culture unless and until
a recipient conceives an idea of it. Cultural
changes, in other words, originate in the
realm of ideas. I do not mean to assert that
the mind – or, to focus on exactly what I mean
by ‘mind’ in the present context, the capacity for generating ideas – is unaffected by
evolution. As far as we can tell, our capacity
for thought is itself a product of evolution
and, if it is true – as we suppose, on the basis
of our present knowledge – that humans
have an exceptional capacity for generating
ideas, evolution should have played some part
in endowing us with it.
As a working hypothesis, I propose that
ideas are a byproduct of a well-equipped imagination, which in turn is a product of a welldeveloped power of anticipation. Evolution
selects for anticipation, especially in the case
of hunting animals, who need to be able to
anticipate the behaviour both of prey and
of rival predators, often in environments
which occlude the senses. Homo sapiens
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needs a relatively rich imagination to make
up for the feebleness of body, slowness of
gait and weakness of sight and smell that disadvantage us as hunters. This, I suspect, is
why humans have so many more ideas than
other primates, who resemble us so closely
in so many other respects, but who rarely
or never eat meat and who typically do not
go hunting. Now that some chimpanzee
communities have taken this step and have
embraced the ecology of hunters, I think it is
unfanciful to speculate that their trajectory of
change could eventually draw closer to ours,
as hunting becomes more important in their
economies, evolution responds accordingly,
and chimps get ever more imaginative.
However that may be, the link between
ideas and cultural change is unproblematic.
We observe our world. We imagine it differently. We work to realize our imagined
world. But this still leaves the increasing
pace of cultural change unexplained. If I am
right so far, ideas need to multiply in order
for cultural change to accelerate. The bestattested reason for the multiplication of ideas
is the fertilizing effect of exchange. Ideas
multiply as the result of dialogue. That is why
we are here, talking to one another. Cultures
change, in part, at least, because unfamiliar
ideas about how to do things impinge from
outside. For example, the work of Jared
Diamond has made familiar the notion that
Eurasia has been an arena of faster change
than other parts of the world because its
geography favours intense exchanges of
culture between its indigenous civilizations
(Diamond, 1997: 354–75 ff.). Isolation retards
change, exchange stimulates it.
This helps us understand why for so much
of the human past cultural change was so slow
– barely exceeding, as we have seen, the rate
of change in other cultural species. The story
of our past has been, for most of the time,
one of divergence, as human communities
migrated across the globe and in many cases
lost touch with one another. Such cultural
changes as occurred during the period of
divergence are largely explicable in terms of

adaptations to the different environments
human migrants encountered. Subsequently,
at first very gradually or fitfully, as sundered
communities re-established contact, ideas
oscillated with increasing frequency across
newly established frontiers, generating or
contributing to the generation of accelerating
change (Fernández-Armesto, 2006). Among
the changes were projects for extending the
reach of exploration and exchange, and technologies to effect them: striking examples
of re-imaginings of the world, realized in
practice. The beginning of a new, and so far
relatively short, period of convergence therefore coincided with a quickening of change of
all kinds. The most marked feature of the very
recent past – which we call globalization –
is, from one point of view, intensified exchange. To put it crudely, change grows out
of exchange (Fracchia and Lewontin, 2002).
The more exchange, the more change. Intercultural contacts do not just reshake the
kaleidoscope of the world; they also multiply
the crystals it contains.
Felipe Fernández-Armesto
Tufts University
Part III: Engaging with the politics of
determinist environmental thinking
History is real simple. (Rush Limbaugh, quoted
in Nash et al., 2000: 6)

The paradox that neo-environmental determinism has apparently convinced so many
despite its fatal epistemological and empirical
flaws suggests the need to treat it as part
of the process of underdevelopment rather
than as pop science in need of debunking.
Debunking certainly poses no great challenge
because environmental determinism’s lack
of engagement with complex historical
processes in favor of making simplistic categorical associations mimics the major
epistemological defect of racism, sexism,
and other determinisms (Sluyter, 2005). A
propensity for fallacious empirical claims
further undermines neo-environmental
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determinists’ conclusions (Sluyter, 2003).
That they nonetheless enjoy some credibility
thus remains largely inexplicable except as an
initial effect of a weakening of the nature/
society divide that has long defined the foundational structure of modernism (Sluyter,
2002: 215–27). Interminable debunking and
philosophical speculation, however, have
come to seem less useful than treating neoenvironmental determinism as an object of
analysis in research on underdevelopment,
much as political ecologists have already
studied the roles of racism, sexism, and
Orientalism in that phenomenon (Sluyter,
1999). Such an analysis would at a minimum
need to focus on how neo-environmental
determinism has supplanted racism as the
major pop explanation for underdevelopment
and on how neo-environmental determinism
emerges in and impacts particular sites of
underdevelopment, including universities.
Neo-environmental determinism certainly
seems to have supplanted racism as the major
pop science explanation for underdevelopment. In general terms, that brand of racism
essentializes peoples of non-European origin
as forever incapable of creativity and productivity or, at best, as requiring a long colonial
apprenticeship before achieving the capacity for independence and development. In
an effort to supplant such ideas, the author
of one of the best-known neo-environmental
determinist books on underdevelopment
actually claims he wrote Guns, germs, and
steel: the fate of human societies as a counterargument to racism (Diamond, 1997: 18–25).
Ironically, racist and environmental determinist explanations of underdevelopment
share so many key characteristics that they
complement rather than counter each other.
Both ignore colonial and (post)colonial processes, with Diamond ending Guns, germs,
and steel some five centuries ago, just as
the dichotomy between the developed and
underdeveloped worlds was beginning to
emerge. Both instead emphasize supposedly
innate characteristics, genetic in one case
and geological in the other. Diamond’s

15

(1997: 376–401) attempt to explain African
underdevelopment thus differs from the
racist one he claims to counter only by retreating from genetic determinants to environmental ones, most basically the relatively
small surface area and meridional orientation of that continent. Thus, he argues,
Africa’s blackness has not determined its
underdevelopment; instead, its environment has determined both its blackness and
its underdevelopment. Racism and neoenvironmental determinism, then, equally
obfuscate the historical processes that explain underdevelopment in favor of correlating racial or environmental categories to
ones of wealth and power, eliding the possibilities for constructive change that begin
with acceptance of social responsibility and
come to fruition through restructuration of
social relations.
Given that racist and environmental determinist arguments play the same obfuscating
role, the replacement of the former by the
latter must involve a response to some sort
of dynamism in the process of underdevelopment itself. One possible source relates to
the diasporas of (post)colonial peoples that
began during the cold war: Algerians to
France, Indonesians to the Netherlands,
Indians to the UK, Cubans and other Latinos
to the USA, and so on. US Census 2000
provides one measure of the scale of that
phenomenon: 35.3 million people selfidentified as Hispanic or Latino, already by
then 12.5% of the total population and projected to grow to 30% by 2050 (Therrien
and Ramirez, 2000). Such (post)colonial
migration contrasts markedly with that of
the 1800s and early 1900s, when European
groups such as Irish, Italians, and Germans
comprised the largest ethnic minorities in
the USA. In addition to underdeveloped
countries having replaced European ones as
the main sources of migrants, Europe itself
has become a destination, a role previously
filled largely by its settler colonies such as the
USA. Moreover, migrants have increasingly
become transnational in that they maintain
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persistent connections to their origin communities through remittances, circular migration, and voting (Davis, 2000).
As (post)colonial underdevelopment processes have relocated ever larger numbers of
African, Latin American, and Asian workers
toward developed countries, the racist
obfuscation of underdevelopment has become counterproductive to neoliberal policies. Characterizing immigrants as racially
incapable of creativity and productivity would
alienate them rather than co-opt them as
voters, workers, and consumers. Even characterizing them as requiring long tutelage
before becoming productive seems inane
give the many recruited directly into the hightech industries of Europe and the USA.
Neo-environmental determinism provides
neoliberals with a strategic revision of the
racist obfuscation by shifting the supposed
cause of underdevelopment from people to
environment, from genes to geology. Latinos
living in the USA can thereby be producers
and consumers of value-added goods while
their countries of origin remain underdeveloped suppliers of raw materials and cheap
labor because of presumed environmentally
deficiencies. Neo-environmental determinism thus maintains the obfuscations of
racism but with the added benefit of facilitating the vast transfer of skilled labor and
mass consumption from the underdeveloped
world to the developed world while maintaining their existing political-economic
relations.
Beyond elaborating understanding of that
global context, a political ecology of neoenvironmental determinism would have to
focus on particular sites of underdevelopment, including universities. Given the part
that academics have played in revising racism
into neo-environmental determinism, universities might actually be the most pertinent
sites of all. Political ecologists can in that
sense begin to treat universities much as
they do the African villages, Amazonian
forest preserves, international development
organizations, or biotech corporations that

they typically study. Each such site provides
a different type of entry into the process
of underdevelopment, and even sites such
as university departments that seem far removed from the negative social and environmental effects on the ground in Africa or Asia
might yield an essential explanatory element.
In his latest book, The university in chains,
Henry Giroux (2007) provides some insight
into how neoliberals have secured academic
sanction for an obfuscating explanation of
underdevelopment that facilitates avoidance of democratic accountability for social
and environmental destruction. As a point
of departure, he uses Dwight Eisenhower’s
final speech as US President, when on 17
January 1961 he warned of the ‘acquisition
of unwarranted influence, whether sought or
unsought, by the military-industrial complex’
(Eisenhower, quoted in Giroux, 2007: 14).
But Giroux extends that complex to include
universities, terming it the military-industrialacademic complex. In part his insights into
that extended alliance derive, as do my own,
from experiences while a member of the
faculty at the Pennsylvania State University,
commonly known as Penn State (Giroux,
2007: 107–108). During the 1950s, Milton
Eisenhower, Dwight’s brother, served as president of Penn State and used his Pentagon
connections to establish that university as
a major defense contractor. That process
marked the campus landscape with the
secretive Applied Research Laboratory, the
Breazeale Nuclear Reactor, and the Garfield
Thomas Water Tunnel, used to design submarine hulls and torpedoes.
Now, as Giroux demonstrates, the pressures on academics to adopt the obfuscating
explanations that serve neoliberal policy
have never been greater. His analysis ranges
from quantifying sources of research funding
to textual deconstruction, and draws three
compelling conclusions. First, the militaryindustrial-academic complex has over the
past two decades drawn in many more universities than those such as Penn State
that established strong connections to the
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Department of Defense during the cold war.
Second, that process threatens the democratic foundations of US society. Third, academic faculty and students can counter that
process through critical research, teaching,
and learning.
With his focus on cultural studies and
critical pedagogy, Giroux does not directly
address the emergence of neo-environmental
determinism at universities, but he does
point political ecologists toward the sorts
of questions that will lead to greater understanding of that phenomenon and therefore
the processes of underdevelopment. To
illustrate, we can use Diamond once again.
As a biologist, he lacks the expertise to study
underdevelopment; his research on that
topic therefore lacks methodological and
empirical rigor, and he consequently has to
publish it as popular science rather than in
refereed, scholarly journals. Why under those
circumstances would UCLA, putatively an
intellectual meritocracy dedicated to rigorous
scholarship and education, appoint him as
a professor of geography?3 Who approved
that appointment and who resisted? Who
benefited from it and how? Who invited
him to present the opening plenary at the
2007 Association of American Geographers
meeting? Who promoted that choice and
who resisted it? Who benefited from it and
how? Does Diamond’s new status as a geographer, conferred by some at UCLA and
endorsed by others at the AAG, influence
the reception of his arguments in academic disciplines beyond geography, in government, and among the general public?
Does that status influence the adoption of
neo-environmental determinism within and
beyond the discipline of geography or deepen
the intellectual chasm between its physical
and human component parts (Sluyter et al.,
2006)? Will nature/society research within
and beyond geography become less rigorous and capable under the influence of
neo-environmental determinism, resulting
in increasingly poorer rather than better
understandings of underdevelopment?
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Giroux also provides political ecologists
with guidance on the sorts of data and analysis available to answer such questions.
Such research should involve deconstruction of the minutes of meetings recovered
from the archives of academic societies and
university departments; of speeches and
papers by neo-environmental determinists;
of their books; and of syllabi in geography and
other disciplines. It should include analysis
of the distribution of positive and negative
book reviews as well as of citation patterns
across different disciplines and nationalities. It
should include participant observation of the
military-industrial-academic complex to, for
example, determine the prevalence of neoenvironmental determinist thinking among
military clients of academic geographers
(Potter and Sluyter, 2007). And, of course, it
should follow the money.
If political ecologists are to understand
neo-environmental determinism as part of
the process of underdevelopment, engaging
such questions about our own universities
becomes as necessary as research on conservation policy in Africa, genetically modified soybeans in South America, or soil
erosion in Asia.
Andrew Sluyter
Louisiana State University
Notes
1.

However, there are also parallels between earlier
environmental determinisms and today in terms of
imperial geopolitics (cf. Peet, 1985; Godlewska and
Smith, 1994), and a concern to celebrate the ‘local’
(culture or ecology) in the face of homo-genization
and/or destruction.
2. With the possible exception of poetry perhaps: let
us have some new anthologies of ‘green’ poetry
that go beyond the scenery-and-flowers surfaces.
3. I completed this essay about half a year before the
news broke that some of the native peoples Jared
Diamond has used in his publications are now suing
him for libel, a development that has prompted more
geographers to begin asking how he ever gained the
credibility to write about underdevelopment given
him by a faculty position in a geography department and plenary lectures at the AAG meetings
(the 20 April 2009 court summons is available at
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www.stinkyjournalism.org/misc/Mandingo_and_
Wemp_vs_Advance_Publications_and_Jared_
Diamond.pdf, last accessed 1 June 2009).

References
Adams, W.A. and Mulligan, M., editors 2003:
Decolonizing nature: strategies for conservation in a
post-colonial era. London: Earthscan.
Berry, S. 2002: On the problem of laws in nature and
history: a comparison. In Pomper, P. and Shaw, D.G.,
editors, The return of science: evolution, history, and
theory, Lanham, MD: Roman and Littlefield, 265–86.
Brunnschweiler, C.N. 2008: Cursing the blessings?
Natural resource abundance, institutions, and
economic growth. World Development 36, 399–419.
Brunnschweiler, C.N. and Bulte, E.H. 2008: The
resource curse revisited and revised: a tale of paradoxes and red herrings. Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 55, 248–64.
Castree, N., Fuller, D., Kent, A., Kobayashi, A.,
Merrett, C.D., Pulido, L. and Barraclough, L.
2008: Forum: Geography, pedagogy and politics.
Progress in Human Geography 32, 680–718.
Clottes, J., editor 2001: La Grotte Chauvet: l’art des
origines. Paris: Seuil.
Davis, M. 2000: Magical urbanism: Latinos reinvent the
US big city. New York: Verso.
Dawkins, R. 1976: The selfish gene. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
de Waal, A. 2007: Is climate change the culprit
in Darfur? Retrieved 1 June 2009 from http://
www.ssrc.org/blogs/darfur/2007/06/25/is-climatechange-the-culprit-for-darfur
de Waal, F. 1986: Chimpanzee politics. New York:
Harper and Rowe.
—, editor 2001: Tree of origin. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
— 2002: The ape and the sushi master. New York: Basic
Books.
de Waal, F. and Tyack, P.L., editors 2003: Animal
social complexity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Diamond, J. 1997: Guns, germs, and steel: the fates of
human societies. New York: W.W. Norton.
— 2005: Collapse: how societies choose to fail or survive.
London: Allen Lane.
Durham, W. 1991: Coevolution: genes, culture, and
human diversity. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University
Press.
F e r n á n d e z - A r m e s t o , F . 2001: Civilizations:
culture, ambition, and the transformation of nature.
New York: Free Press.
— 2006: Pathfinders: a global history of exploration.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fracchia, J. and R.C. Lewontin, R.C. 2002: Does
culture evolve? in Pomper, P. and Shaw, D.G.,
editors, The return of science: evolution, history, and
theory, Lanham, MD: Roman and Littlefield, 233-63.

Frisch, M. 1957: Homo faber. Frankfurt-am-Main:
Suhrkamp.
Geertz, C. 2005: Very bad news. New York Review of
Books 52(5), 24 March. Retrieved 1 June 2009 from
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17850
Giroux, H.A. 2007: The university in chains: confronting
the military-industrial-academic complex. Boulder,
CO: Paradigm.
Godlewska, A. and Smith, N., editors 1994: Geography
and empire. Oxford: Blackwell.
Goodall, J., 1990: Through a window: 30 years observing
the Gombe chimpanzees. London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson.
Hurley, S. and Nudds, M., editors 2006: Rational
animals? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Johnston, R. 2007: Book review: Diamond, J. 2005:
Collapse: how societies choose to fail or survive.
Progress in Human Geography 31, 408–10.
Jorde, L.B., Bamshad, M.J. and Rodgers, A.B.
1998: Using mitochondrial and nuclear DNA as
markers to reconstruct human evolution. Bioessays
20, 126-36.
Kobayashi, A. and Peake, L. 2000: Racism out of
place: thoughts on whiteness and an antiracist
geography in the new millennium. Annals of the
Association of American Geographers 90, 392–403.
Leach, M. and Mearns, R., editors 1996: The lie of
the land: challenging received wisdom on the African
environment. Oxford: James Currey.
Li, T.M. 2002: Engaging simplifications: communitybased resource management, market processes
and state agendas in upland Southeast Asia. World
Development 30, 265–83.
Lomborg, B. 2001: The skeptical environmentalist.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mann, J., Connor, R.C., Tyack, P.L. and
Whitehead, H., editors 2000: Cetacean societies:
field studies of dolphins and whales. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Nash, G.B., Crabtree, C. and Dunn, R.E. 2000:
History on trial: culture wars and the teaching of the
past. New York: Vintage Books.
Peet, R. 1985: The social origins of environmental
determinism. Annals of the Association of American
Geographers 75, 309–33.
Peet, R. and Watts, M., editors 2004: Liberation
ecologies: environment, development, social movements
(second edition). London: Routledge.
Posner, R. 2004: Catastrophe: risk and response. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Potter, A.E. and Sluyter, A. 2007: Antigua and
Barbuda: land tenure and transnational migration.
Paper presented at the 2007 Meeting of the Southwestern Division of the Association of American
Geographers, Bryan, Texas, 1–3 November 2007.
Pryor, K. and Norris, K.S., editors 1991: Dolphin
societies: discoveries and puzzles. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Sarah A. Radcliffe et al.: Environmentalist thinking and/in geography
Said, E. 1978: Orientalism. New York: Vintage.
Sluyter, A. 1999: The making of the myth in postcolonial
development: material-conceptual landscape transformation in sixteenth-century Veracruz. Annals
of the Association of American Geographers 89,
377–401.
— 2002: Colonialism and landscape: postcolonial
theory and applications. New York: Rowman and
Littlefield.
— 2003: Neo-environmental determinism, intellectual
damage control, and nature/society science. Antipode
35, 813–17.
— 2005: Joint review of Is Geography Destiny? Lessons
from Latin America, by John L. Gallup, Alejandro
Gaviria, and Eduardo Lora; and Troubled Harvest:
Agronomy and Revolution in Mexico, 1880–2002, by
Joseph Cotter. Annals of the Association of American
Geographers 95, 232–36.
Sluyter, A., Augustine, D., Bitton, M.C, Sullivan,
T.J. and Wang, F. 2006: The recent intellectual

19

structure of geography. Geographical Review 96,
594–608.
Smail, D. 2008: On deep history and the brain. Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press.
Stanford, C.B. 1998: Chimpanzee and red colobus: the
ecology of hunter and prey. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Therrien, M. and Ramirez, R.R. 2000: The Hispanic
population in the United States. Washington, DC: US
Census Bureau.
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
2007: Sudan: post-conflict environmental assessment.
Nairobi: UNEP.
Walker, P.A. 2005: Political ecology: Where is the
ecology? Progress in Human Geography 29, 73–82.
Wrangham, R., McGrew, W.C., de Waal, F.B.M.
and Heltne, P.G., editors 1994: Chimpanzee
cultures. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

